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The Center for European Neighborhood Studies (CENS) is an independent 
research center of the Central European University (CEU) located in 
Budapest, Hungary. Its main goal is to contribute to an informed 
international dialogue about the future of the European Union in the world, 
while capitalizing on its Central European perspective and regional 
embeddedness. 
The strategic focus of the center is academic and policy-oriented research on 
the place and role of the European Union in its rapidly changing and 
increasingly volatile neighborhood. Through its research, CENS seeks to 
contribute to the understanding of the environment where the EU, its 
member states and partners need to (co)operate, and it aims at supporting 
the constructive development of these relations by providing opportunities 
for discussion and exchange. The center’s geographic focus areas are 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and Turkey, Eastern 
Europe, the South Caucasus and Russia. 
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and developments along the enlargement frontiers of Europe. It fills an 
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the prospects of the future. Furthermore, it follows and gives regular 
account of the EU Enlargement process both from an inside and an 
applicant perspective. 
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Introduction 
by Łukasz A. Janulewicz 
 
Introduction 
As China’s global role is increasing, its influence is being increasingly 
scrutinized. The Belt and Road Initiative is probably the most visible 
manifestation of China’s global aspirations. Much attention is being paid to its 
role in Africa and Asia. Publications highlight the ‘Backlash to Belt and Road’ in 
Central and Southern Asia, 1 the notorious ‘debt trap diplomacy’ also associated 
with China’s investment in Asia and Africa2 or the potential risks for governance 
in fragile states.3 Nevertheless, other analysts highlight the opportunities and 
benefits of Chinese activity in these regions.4 At the same time, Western Europe 
is also getting weary of China’s growing role in Europe’ economy amidst concerns 
about ‘technology and know-how outflow’.5 The same goes for China’s takeover of 
key port infrastructure in the Mediterranean and the North Sea.6 
The purpose of this publication, and the conference from which it emerged, is to 
try to take stock of the experiences of Central Europe’s neighbours that were far 
more exposed to China’s and by reviewing Central Europe’s own interactions 
with China’s investment efforts so far to think about which of these experiences 
from the post-Soviet region and from the Western Balkans should be taken into 
account by Central European countries in their dealings with China. 
The Central European region plays a key role in these plans the gateway to 
Europe. At the same time, Central Europe’s appetite for investment and 
infrastructure projects has not yet been saturated. China is offering an 
alternative source for such investment and political contacts are increasing 
across the region, particularly visible in the 16+1 Format. In the current political 
climate some regional leaders, like Hungary’s Prime Minister, appear 
increasingly attracted to Chinese capital, while others are far more cautious. 7 
Therefore, we hope this publication will make a contribution to the debates about 
                                                 
1 E.g. Andrew Small, The Backlash to Belt and Road: A South Asian Battle Over Chinese Economic Power, 
Foreign Affairs, 16 February 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-16/backlash-belt-
and-road  
2 The Economist, The perils of China’s “debt-trap diplomacy”, 6 September 2018, 
https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/09/06/the-perils-of-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy  
3 Jing Gu and Rhiannon McCluskey, Is China’s Role in African Fragile States Exploitative or Developmental? 
IDS Policy Briefing 91, 1 March 2015, Brighton: Institute for Development Studies 
4 J. Peter Pham, Abdoul Salam Bello and Boubacar-Sid Barry, Chinese Aid and Investment Are Good for 
Africa, Foreign Policy, 31 August 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/31/chinese-aid-and-investment-are-
good-for-africa/  
5 Euobserver Ticker, Berlin wants tougher controls of company sales to China, euobserver.com, 29 January 
2018, https://euobserver.com/tickers/140735?fbclid=IwAR0Qu1CriGR-
sy6mykd9xe_OvQSs2IDcB1PwioGchLR8zQo3R5MhsgcheAk  
6 Keith Johnson, Why Is China Buying Up Europe’s Ports? Foreign Policy, 2 February 2018, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/02/why-is-china-buying-up-europes-ports/  
7 Lili Bayer, China hits roadblocks in Central Europe, Politico.com, 26 November 2017, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/china-hits-roadblocks-in-central-europe/  
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China’s role in Central Europe and the ever intensifying scrutiny that Chinese 
investment generates all across the European Union. 
The first contribution, by Jacopo Maria Pepe, reviews China’s investments in 
Central Asia. He highlights rapidly growing Chinese investment in the region 
and the compatibility between China’s state-led development approach and the 
political realities of Central Asia. The chapter also points out that the economic 
challenges some Central European countries are currently facing might, in 
combination with growing Chinese investments, develop into an asymmetrical 
dependency, in parts not unlike that one can observe in Central Asia. 
Anastas Vangeli, in the second contribution, take a closer look at the situation in 
the Western Balkans. He highlights the limitations of the traditional Western 
model of infrastructure investment and the alternative funding source that 
China provides for the countries in this region.  He also points out that the bold 
Chinese approach towards risky infrastructure projects has been a necessary 
wake up call for the economic stagnation in the Western Balkans, albeit the 
lacking emphasis on prudence, accountability and efficiency has proven 
challenging for the governments of the region. Ultimately, he argues that while 
there are substantial challenges in many projects, these have been addressed 
creatively in many cases and long-term potential is being positively assessed in 
the region. 
Turning our attention to Central Europe, the third contribution by Richard Q. 
Turcsányi, compares the Western Balkan experience with that of the Visegrad 
countries. It highlights the limited appeal of the Chinese offer for Central 
Europe, due to more attractive EU funding and EU public procurement 
regulations, in contrast to the real alternative that China offers to the Western 
Balkans. The Chinese approach, as he argues, also fails to address political 
sensibilities in Central Europe and has not yet undertaken steps to address 
these sufficiently.  
Ágnes Szunomár, in contribution number four, further develops the Central 
European perspective on Chinese investment, with particular attention to 
Hungary. While China’s investments are growing and could provide alternatives 
to the dependency on Western Europe, their overall role is still minimal. Thus, 
as in the case of the Orban government, political considerations rather than 
economic rationale are driving closer ties to China at the moment. 
The final contribution, by Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, takes a different 
perspective and investigates the operation of Chinese investments at the 
national level, focusing on the case of Latvia. She takes the unusual perspective 
of SME investments, in contrast to the widespread focus on large Chinese 
investments, often pursued by major state-owned corporations. Her findings 
suggest that such smaller and private Chinese investment can avoid many of the 
problematic practices associated with major Chinese projects. 
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China´s investments and investment policy in Central Asia: 
which lessons for Central Europe? 
by Jacopo Maria Pepe 
 
Introduction 
This paper briefly discusses and evaluates China´s investments and investment 
policy in Central Asia from the point of view of Beijing’s general geoeconomic and 
geopolitical interest for the region as well as possible lessons (if any) for Central 
Eastern Europe. 
 It will, first, present the evolution of China´s ties with Central Asia in the past 
20 years both in terms of trade and investments and China´s goals in the region. 
Second, it discusses China´s investment policy instruments and their economic 
and political impact on Central Asia. And third, it attempts to draw lessons from 
the Central Asian experience for CEE by comparing China´s investment and 
trade politics in Central Asia with China´s rising influence in Central Eastern 
Europe in the framework of China´s Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 
2025.  
The role of Chinese investment in Central Asia 
China´s trade and investment in Central Asia started from a very low basis, took 
almost two decades to kick-start. Notwithstanding the small size of the regional 
markets and the small share of Central Asia in China´s total trade and 
investment, China´s interest in Central Asia is long-term and multipronged and 
the region lies at the core of China´s security, foreign and foreign economic 
policy. 
China relations with Central Asia have dramatically evolved since the end of the 
cold war, with trade and investments expanding particularly since the early 
2000s.  China’s relation with the region was almost non-existent during the Cold 
War, when the Sino-Soviet border was one of the most sealed in the world.  
Shortly after the break-up of the Soviet Union, however, China rapidly 
established diplomatic relations with the Central Asian states and settled 
centuries-old territorial disputes by signing treaties with many of them. This led 
to the reopening border crossing points and physical links and paved the way for 
expanding and deepening economic and trade ties before the BRI was launched.   
However, it took more than 10 years to kick-start these relations and almost 20 
to establish China as a major economic and financial player in the region: it was 
only in the early 2000, with the launch of the “Western Development Strategy”, 
that economic ties, trade and investment ballooned. While the launch of the BRI 
has functioned as a catalyst for accelerating trade and investment instruments 
since 2013, these started to rise before it, with a sudden increase particularly 
since 2008-2010, as consequence of the global financial and economic crisis. 
In terms of trade, China is particularly dominant as a trade partner in all five 
central Asian Countries. China has already become the first single trade partner 
for some of them (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan) or challenges directly 
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Russia´s traditional position (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan). Considering the whole 
region, bilateral trade reached 30 Billion USD in 2017 from roughly 1 Billion 
USD annually in the 1990s.  China has already surpassed Russia as top trader 
and is second only to the EU. The trade boom has been based on 
complementarities between China and the economies of Central Asia. China´s 
imports from Central Asia are mainly oil and gas (70%) from Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and, to a less extent, Uzbekistan. For its part, China has 
increased the exports of electronics, household appliances and, particularly after 
the launch of the BRI, industrial machinery and transport equipment.  
In terms of investments, the FDI stock has sky-rocked from less than 45 million 
in 2003 to 7.5 Billion in 2012, largely concentrated in the oil and gas sector, with 
Kazakhstan being the biggest recipient. After the launch of the BRI, however, 
investments have diversified to include agro-industry, petrochemical industry 
and logistics. Also, they are increasingly modelled on the concept of the 
International Capacity Cooperation and Financial Support developed first with 
Kazakhstan in 2014. Moreover, Chinese investments happen in form of Financial 
Aids more than FDI.  Kazakhstan is the biggest recipient with different 
agreements signed since 2014 and 51 projects being realized under the BRI 
initiative and the International Capacity Cooperation scheme, worth 27 Billion 
USD.  
From an analysis of the evolution of China´s investment policy,  the main 
overriding interests behind China’s investments in Central Asian countries are 
seemingly 4, all long-term, and not influenced by short-term setbacks or 
failures.: to diversify energy imports away from the Middle East by building 
needed infrastructure; to stabilize the Western regions, particularly Xinjiang, by 
strengthening cross-regional economic and industrial development, to promote 
and protect PRC economic interest in the region and beyond by building 
transport and logistic corridors in order to internationalize own production 
capacity, value and supply chains and to reach out to new markets along the 
southern border of Eurasia (from East to west Asia, Middle East and Central 
Eastern Europe); to increase and secure political influence by attaching political 
conditionality to the financial aid. 
China’s Investment Instruments 
China´s Investments in Central Asia are a complex mix of direct investments, 
aid and loans, free of conditionality but linked to political loyalty. The central 
Asian case augments the risks factors inherent in China´s investment policy, 
even though central Asian elites are still betting on BRI and synchronize their 
domestic initiatives to China´s investments. 
China investment policy in Central Asia does not differ from China´s general 
scheme: it is a complex mix of foreign direct investments, foreign aid, trade 
agreements and particularly financial loans.  The main characteristics of China´s 
aid is the lack of conditionality on good governance, human rights and market-
oriented reforms as required by the OECD.  China is not a member of the OECD 
and is not obliged to comply with DAC (Development Assistance Committee) 
guidelines on foreign aid. While China understands bilateral investment 
cooperation as a win-win scheme which does not imply any form of political 
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transformative conditionality in the recipient country, Beijing’s investments 
policy implies political loyalty on critical political issues for Beijing like the One 
China Policy, relations with Taiwan, cooperation in regional security operation 
against separatism, alignment with Beijing at UN level. 
In terms of loans, in Central Asia China has typically provided governments of 
the region with loans in exchange for the right to extract and transport mineral 
resources, attached to direct investments in extractive industry.  This has been 
the case in Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, with the construction of the CAC oil 
pipeline and the Turkmenistan-China gas-pipeline, matched by China´s 
increased FDI in the upstream and increasingly, in the downstream sector. 
Since the launch of BRI, however, particularly in Kazakhstan, the International 
Capacity cooperation scheme represents a new integrated form of investment in 
line with the goal of „Made in China 2025” and of the BRI. It combines a mix of 
finance support/loans by policy banks and offshoring of production activities by 
Chinese companies in the industrial and equipment manufacturing sector which 
goes beyond the oil and gas sector. In Kazakhstan this involves particularly the 
chemical, mining, metallurgical, agricultural, machine-building and 
rail&logistics sectors as well as in the electronic and IT sector (Huawei and 
Alibaba), in Kirgizstan the agribusiness.  
For Central Asian regimes, investments are much needed in these spheres and 
make strategic sense as these countries need to re-link to regional and global 
value and supply chains and diversify their economy. Given the nature of these 
regimes, they generally welcome Chinese investments. For instance, Kazakhstan 
has been eager to synchronize its domestic development plan Nurly Jol with the 
BRI. While China´s investments don´t threaten the stability of these regimes, 
diffused anti-Chinese resentment in the population and growing political 
dependence represent indeed an increasingly debated issue among the elites. 
In fact, China´s investments policy presents three critical factors, which are 
augmented in the case of Central Asia  
A) Debt trap:  China’s generous loans are contributing to a serious debt spiral in 
Central Asia—about 40 percent (or US$1.5 billion) of Kyrgyzstan’s public 
debt, and 50 percent (or US$1.1 billion) of Tajikistan’s, is owed to Chinese 
institutions (mainly, China Export-Import Bank, or Exim Bank). This 
number are however lower for Kazakhstan, which has more diversified trade 
relations. 
B) Lack of technology transfer, soft infrastructure, effect on local employment: a 
large share of the funds injected by China into Central Asia never leaves the 
Chinese system: a loan granted by a Chinese bank to a Central Asian 
government is reinvested in the Chinese company that got the contract, 
which brings Chinese equipment and a Chinese workforce to Central Asia to 
carry out the project. This closed system favors hard infrastructure over soft 
one and only partially spur the improvement of the investment climate, 
increase good governance, and foster the emergence of new tertiary economic 
sectors requiring local high-level human skills, all elements desperately 
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needed by Central Asian countries, which have a young but largely unskilled 
population in need of employment 
C) New unilateral economic (and political) dependency: as the case of 
Turkmenistan demonstrates, unilateral „ultra-connectivity” with China does 
not end up in greater economic developments while on the long-term, it can 
doubtless increase political dependencies from China´s foreign policy agenda.  
Lessons for Central and Eastern Europe 
Which lessons, if any, can be drown for Central Eastern European countries? By 
several critical differences between the Central Asian and the Central Eastern 
European case, few lessons can be drawn: China´s successful “inroads” is slow 
and long-term; is function of local dysfunctionalities, lack of regional 
coordination/integration and absence of strong regional players. 
On a more general, geopolitical level, China sees both Central Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia as crucial “interstitial spaces”, i.e., those spaces located at 
critical geographic junctures of the Eurasian landmass which can connect to 
greater regional geo-economic spaces and can be used as an off-shore production 
platform for the own industry to access and establish itself in new markets. 
Moreover, Central Eastern Europe and Central Asia are considered not only 
bridges to other external spaces but also part of an interconnecting Central 
Eurasian economic and transport space stretching from western Xinyang to the 
Danube plain via Caspian, Black and Mediterranean Sea and which is targeted 
by the BRI initiative. Hence, investments activities of Chinese companies and 
banks should always be considered from this more holistic point of view. 
However while China´s investment policy follows a general and relatively 
undifferentiated “modus operandi” which poses similar challenges in different 
regions and countries, and acts under a more or less coherent geostrategic 
scheme, its impact in Central Asia differs greatly from that in Central Europe:  
First, Central Asian countries are largely raw material-based and poorly 
diversified economies, scarcely integrated in regional and global supply chain 
and depend heavily on China´s demand for oil and gas and on China´s quick and 
affordable loans. Their authoritarian regimes welcome the Chinese loans, which 
don´t threaten the regime´s stability. Their economic and political weakness 
make them however particularly vulnerable to China´s quest for political loyalty.  
On the contrary, Central-Eastern European EU-Members are largely 
manufacturing and service economies, strong integrated in European, and 
specifically German´s value and supply chains and in the EU´s legal framework. 
Consequently, the influence of China´s investments and of its approach is still 
limited, challenged by the EU´s strong norms and standards requirements. For 
CEE, China is currently scarcely a relevant source of investments, as in the case 
of Central Asia, and, for now, no serious alternative to the EU in terms of trade. 
Otherwise, EU membership and integration in logistic, transport and production 
chains represent a guarantee against deepening Chinese involvement, as the 
negative case of Western Balkans shows.  
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 Second, the lack of geographic proximity and of immediate security threats for 
China´s internal stability makes ties with CEE for Beijing a less urgent political 
issue than Central Asia.  Beijing’s degree of political influence based on 
asymmetric economic dependencies, is in CEE likely to be more function of the 
decision of some Central Eastern European countries to play the “Chinese card” 
than a declared, vital Chinese interest to transform them in “loyal political 
tributary.” 
Conclusion 
This all being said, some useful, long-term lessons can be drawn for CEE from 
the Central Asian experience: 
a) China´s economic influence grows over long-time and short-term failures 
might turn into long-terms victories. 
b) It grows the more, the less a region is integrated in existing regional 
production and supply chains or the more the incumbent regional pivotal power 
is in retreat, fragmenting or not paying attention (Germany/EU in the case of 
CEE as compared to Russia in CA) 
c) In the long run, challenges in the present CEE´s economic model and China´s 
evolving strategy toward high-value production could expose some CEE to 
greater dependence on China´s investments replicating the CA-China 
asymmetric scheme.  More vulnerable to political and economic dependency are 
the countries of the Western Balkans, but some V4 countries are faced by 
increasing challenges related to the combined effect of strained political relations 
with the EU, rapid economic growth, over-dependency on German and European 
production chains and intra-EU trade, increasing scarcity of skilled working 
force, disruptive economic transformations and the need for better regional 
connectivity. In the long run, all these factors and the mix of China´s growing 
investments and political influence could turn into an element of greater, 
asymmetrical dependence from Beijing. 
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On Sino-Balkan Infrastructure Development Cooperation 
by Anastas Vangeli 
 
Introduction 
In the neoliberal common sense, large infrastructure projects are increasingly 
deemed too costly and unprofitable. They are public goods intended for “free use;” 
to the neoliberal mind, there is often no feasible way how to make profit off of 
them, especially in poor countries. Such thinking has made Western creditors 
wary of supporting large infrastructure projects in developing and transitional 
economies whose development is hampered by striking infrastructure gaps, such 
as those of the countries in the Western Balkans. In cases where funding for 
infrastructure has been available, it has been reserved for those who follow the 
neoliberal doctrine. A recent report by the IMF has argued that the Western 
Balkans “faces significant public infrastructure gaps [which] constrain private 
sector development and integration into European supply chains and are an 
obstacle to faster income convergence” 8. Yet, according to IMF experts, despite 
the urgency, infrastructure projects must not be pursued right away – as there 
are several of structural reforms to be done first, which can take years to be 
done. 
For China, a country that has emerged as a champion in infrastructure 
construction at home, and as an increasingly active promoter of cooperation in 
connective infrastructure development around the world, the value of 
infrastructure lies precisely in the fact that infrastructure projects are public 
goods which enable wider economic activity. The Chinese approach is based on 
the logic that “if you want to get rich, you should build a road first” and “if you 
want to invest now, you need (and should be able) to borrow money,” which is in 
line with the assumed national right to development. After all, this is how China 
did it – and according to China every country has the right to do it as well, while 
China is willing to assist, but also to co-benefit from this process. In theory, as 
Chinese policymakers and experts argue, the new economic activity that is 
stimulated with the construction of the new infrastructure (that stems from the 
flow of people, ideas and the diffusion of economic activity, and other unforeseen 
effects), is expected to boost public revenues, which is how infrastructure projects 
will eventually pay for themselves in the future. A recent report by AidData 
using a global dataset shows that “Chinese development projects in general, and 
Chinese transportation projects in particular, reduce economic inequality within 
and between subnational localities” and “produce positive economic spillovers 
that lead to a more equal distribution of economic activity.”9 Furthermore, to 
ensure that infrastructure does indeed lead to economic successes, to its partners 
                                                 
8 Ruben Atoyan and Dóra Benedek, “Public Infrastructure in the Western Balkans: A Highway to Higher 
Income” (International Monetary Fund, 2018), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/02/01/na020818-
public-infrastructure-in-the-western-balkans-a-highway-to-higher-income.  
9 Axel Dreher et al., “Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset,” 
SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, October 1, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3051044.  
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worldwide, China offers broader developmental packages, a narrative, and a 
vision for economic development (for example, through the Belt and Road 
Initiative [BRI]) of how to put the new infrastructure to use. Even if lately China 
has recognized the need to shift towards a more commercial logic in the provision 
of loans for infrastructure projects, the core normative foundations remain 
different from the West (and so is the tolerance to risk). The difference in the 
constitutive principles of the two approaches, defined as ideal-types (not as clear-
cut ones) is summarized in Table 1 below.10 
 Western Approach 
(transactional) 
Chinese Approach 
(relational)  
Core argument “Reform first, build later” “Build a road first” 
Cooperation 
motivation 
Rules-driven Vision-driven 
Reference points Abstract principles Material outcomes 
Context Insular project Broader developmental 
package 
State role in the 
economy 
Supporting Leading 
State imperative Respect (international) 
norms 
Right to national 
development 
Fiscal logic Transactional Possibilistic 
Cost-benefit 
approach 
Focus on costs Focus on benefits 
Expected returns Monetary (internal rate of 
return) 
Added value (external rate 
of return) 
Repayment of loans Strict Flexible 
Core criteria Fiscal fitness, feasibility Good relations (guanxi) 
Selection process Competitive, technocratic Discretionary, political 
Political 
conditionality 
Domestic reforms Diplomatic support 
Internal 
conditionality 
Rules and regulations Hire Chinese SOE as a 
partner 
Implementation 
mechanism 
Public bidding through 
tender only 
Tender or special legislation 
Narrative of the 
project 
Technical - bureaucratic National endeavor for 
growth 
Table 1. Comparison of the Western and the Chinese approach to infrastructure 
development cooperation 
China has thus been particularly encouraging and focused on the promotion of 
infrastructure projects in developing and transitional economies. In the Balkans, 
the Chinese option has emerged not as an alternative, but rather a form of a 
backup or safety net for instances where the Western input was not enough. The 
key connective infrastructure projects in which China participates in the region, 
are perceived as being of national importance by the respective governments. 
Some of these projects have been previously avoided by Western creditors: the 
                                                 
10 For general discussion on the two models of infrastructure development see the talk by Francis Fukuyama at 
UC San Diego, February 2018, https://gps.ucsd.edu/news-events/news/chinas-infrastructure-investment-as-a-
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Balkan countries are small, poor, outside of the EU, and still struggling to make 
all the necessary reforms. Moreover, some of the new highways happen to pass 
through challenging mountainous terrain, that further raises their cost. In 
pursuing these projects, Balkan governments embraced the China-inspired  
model of development cooperation in building connective infrastructure: national 
governments played central role; some of these projects were implemented via 
special laws; they were financed via “tied loans” scheme – Chinese development 
banks provided credit under relatively favorable terms, and in return key 
partners in the implementation are Chinese SOEs (although in some cases, the 
majority of the work was done by local subcontractors). A list of some of the key 
connective infrastructure development projects in the Balkans are listed in Table 
2. 
Country
  
Project  Value Financial 
terms 
Status 
AL Blue Corridor Albanian 
Section 
Unknown Unknown Feasibility 
study 
BiH Banja Luka – Split 
motorway (section in 
Republika Srpska) 
€600mn Credit, 30 
year 
concession 
Planning 
MNE Section of the European 
motorway XI  
€809mn Credit Advanced 
stages 
RS Danube bridge  €170mn Credit Completed 
RS Belgrade-Budapest high-
speed railway link 
(section in Serbia) 
€800mn Credit Works to begin 
in 2018 
RS Sections of the European 
motorway XI (to 
Montenegro) 
€900mn* Credit In construction 
MK Kichevo-Ohrid and 
Miladinovci-Shtip 
motorways 
€580mn* Credit In construction 
Sources: Pavlićević11 and own research; * indicates cost overruns 
Today, these infrastructure projects are the trademark of Sino-Balkan 
cooperation. However, what is central to them is not only the role of China, but 
first and foremost the role of local agency: these projects were not imposed on the 
countries in the region by China; but it was their governments who consciously 
pursued them, taking upon significant responsibility. These projects, in the local 
and the global discourse, are often mistakenly called “Chinese investments” - in 
reality, they are governmental investments done in partnership with China. 
                                                 
11 Dragan Pavlićević, “A Power Shift Underway in Europe? China’s Relationship with Central and Eastern 
Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative,” in Mapping China’s “One Belt One Road” Initiative, ed. Xing Li 
(Palgrave, forthcoming). 
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The Balkan governments' decision to work with China was primarily a 
utilization of the newly available Chinese option. By 2011, Chinese SOEs started 
providing both solicited and unsolicited bids for infrastructure projects in the 
Balkans, in a context of little to no competition or interest by other donors. 
Moreover, China's “charm offensive” in the region via the 16+1 framework and 
the BRI helped in popularizing the Chinese approach and “wisdom” in 
infrastructure construction. Most importantly, however, Balkan governments 
saw the possibility of cooperation with China as a “shortcut” to improving their 
connectivity. This process was underpinned by fascination with China, 
embracing a new geoeconomic imaginary, and a belief that yet again an outside 
actor will bring prosperity to the region. In theory, China was supposed to 
provide a quick fix for one of the most burning needs of the Balkan governments 
(infrastructure development), while not interfering with the domestic policy 
agenda. What they have overlooked, however, that construction of large 
infrastructure projects is much peskier than it seems. 
Overall, the infrastructure projects done in cooperation with China in the region 
so far have a mixed record. While some are developing as planned, in some of the 
cases (in particular the highways constructed by Sinohydro in Macedonia, funded 
by the Chinese ExIm bank; and to some extent the highway constructed by 
CRBC and funded by the ExIm bank in Montenegro), implementation turned out 
much more problematic than initially foreseen, as it was plagued by problems 
such as corruption, lack of due diligence, delays and cost overruns – the looming 
threats to all infrastructure projects, that have made infrastructure an 
unattractive business to begin with. It is important to note that a great share of 
the responsibility for the complications in the project implementation was a 
result of the lack of capacity on the side of the Balkan governments themselves. 
Especially relevant here are the instances of corruption in the Macedonian case, 
where the former government has been charged for corruption in a number of 
other cases, including infrastructure projects implemented in partnership with 
EU companies. 
Nevertheless, all of the projects – even the problematic ones – are under 
construction and in a good shape, and according to official sources would likely 
prove to be successful upon their completion (even it the cases with delays). Yet, 
the complications in some of them have produced bad publicity for the whole of 
the cooperation with China. In particular, their contextualization in the new 
narratives of the new China Threat in the West – for example, turning the 
Balkan countries into a Trojan Horses via debt traps 12 – have made the Balkan 
governments particularly cautious towards taking up new connective 
infrastructure development projects with China, but it has also made Chinese 
                                                 
12 Ryan Heath and Andrew Gray, “Beware Chinese Trojan Horses in the Balkans, EU Warns,” POLITICO 
Europe, July 27, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/johannes-hahn-beware-chinese-trojan-horses-in-the-
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actors wary of scaling up their involvement in the region. Currently, there are no 
new projects being undertaken.13 
At the same time, the Western criticism towards Sino-Balkan cooperation in 
infrastructure development was not only rhetorical. Having for years neglected 
economic development in the Balkans, Western actors themselves made counter-
offers to China: for instance, even the Berlin Process initiated by Western 
European countries in cooperation with the EU as a supplement to the EU 
enlargement agenda, which has connectivity at its core, is framed as one of the 
responses to China. 14 Beyond the Balkans, the US is about to bolster its 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) with additional funding, with 
the goal to also counter China's offer – the work of OPIC is likely to extend to the 
Balkans as well. What these moves will deliver and whether their outcomes will 
be “more of the same” - a continuation of the existing Western approach, with all 
its benefits, but also with all its limitations – or a novel approach, in part, 
paradoxically, also inspired by China, is yet to be seen. At the same time, it is a 
bittersweet reality for the Balkan countries that it was China's interest in the 
region that sparked a greater activity from its traditional partners. 
In conclusion, there are two inter-related points to be made based on this 
assessment of Sino-Balkan cooperation in connective infrastructure 
development. First, after almost three decades of the “monopoly” of the Western 
model of infrastructure development cooperation in the region, which has 
provided limited results, the Chinese model emerged as an additional option for 
filling the infrastructure gap. It brought enthusiasm, but also challenges and 
(international) politicization of the question of infrastructure development 
cooperation. Importantly, local agency has played a key role in the process, 
noting a mixed record. Nevertheless, the important thing is that Balkan 
governments – but also all stakeholders in the region including the EU – have 
gradually accepted the argument that we need to talk more about economy and 
infrastructure; and China played an important role in achieving this. 
Second, the belief that achieving economic success requires bold and sometimes 
risky undertakings by national governments that characterizes the Chinese 
approach (and what the Western approach sometimes lacks), proved to be a 
prerequisite for initiating an economic movement in the rather stagnant 
economic context of the Western Balkans. At the same time, due diligence, 
financial prudence and efficient management of infrastructure projects – that are 
prioritized in the Western approach, and are considered weak points of the 
Chinese approach – were lacking, which complicated the implementation of the 
infrastructure projects in partnership with China in the region. This means that 
while their boldness and pro-activity is a welcome change, the Balkan 
                                                 
13 It can be argued that this may be also a result of the general shift of the Sino-Balkan cooperation from 
infrastructure towards production capacity cooperation and (re)industrialization; at the same time, one argument 
is that Chinese companies need to finish the ongoing projects first, so they can then move their machinery onto 
new ones – as according to insiders in the Sino-Balkan cooperation, the costs of machinery and its transportation 
have been a major challenge so far. 
14 Gisela Grieger, “China, the 16+1 Format and the EU,” Briefing (European Parliament, September 2018). 
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governments also need to work on improving their capacity and accountability 
mechanisms, or in other words, capabilities are yet to meet the demand. 
Yet, for now, the governments in the region seemed to have found balance even 
in the most problematic cases; this is to say that the Hirschmanian principle of 
the Hiding Hand eventually worked out in their favor. Decades ago Albert 
Hirschman15 argued that large infrastructure projects are usually accompanied 
by the phenomenon of “providential ignorance” – while often costs and problems 
exceed the expectations of planners, they are usually offset by the capacity for 
creative improvisation in solving them. A contemporary case in point is the 
Kichevo-Ohrid highway, whose revisions turned to be so complicated that in 
announcing the Appendix which seeks to fix a number of technical and financial 
shortcomings of the initial project, Macedonian officials argued that if they had 
the chance to start over with the negotiations, they would have perhaps chosen 
not to pursue the project to begin with in order to avoid all the headaches. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, the same officials speak fondly of the long-term 
impact of the new highway, which is expected to contribute to the economic 
renewal of the country, and are proud of the state-of-the art tunnels and viaducts 
that are being completed, even if behind schedule. In a turn of events that 
Hirschman may have appreciated, one can make the case that even if their 
predecessors were ignorantly bold in undertaking a risky and costly project, 
eventually the incumbent Macedonian government managed to solve all the 
issues (and even indict the former corrupt officials) and proceed with the 
construction of a project of of utmost importance for its future economic 
development. 
  
                                                 
15 Albert O Hirschman, Cass R Sunstein, and Michele Alacevich, Development Projects Observed (Brookings 
Institution Press, 2015). 
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The peculiar case of China’s (missing) Investments in 
Central Europe 
by Richard Q. Turcsányi 
 
Introduction: The experience with the 16+1 platform 
China made a grand entrance into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 2012 
when it co-organized the Warsaw summit with 16 Prime Ministers from the 
region (eleven EU members and five Western Balkan EU candidate countries). 
Part of China’s initial success in attracting attention have been the economic 
promises, most importantly that it would invest in the region. At the time, the 
CEE region was indeed ‘cash-stripped’, after its Western European investors 
withdrew part of their investments and even their demand for CEE products 
decreased as a result of the global crisis. The emerging superpower China 
seemed at first sight like an obvious answer to the problems of lacking demand 
and capital. 16 
Six years later, we have already gathered some evidence to assess the China-
CEE experience and it is hard to avoid the verdict of economic disappointment, 
particularly when talking about Chinese investments. First, it is true that the 
amount of Chinese FDI did increase but it started to grow from extremely low 
levels and hence Chinese capital remains as marginal to CEE economic 
development today as six years ago. Second, the little Chinese FDI that did 
arrive have not gone into desired sectors, such as green field investments that 
would create new good quality jobs. 
The Czech Republic might be regarded as an exception in Central Europe. It 
attracted about one billion EUR of Chinese FDI in recent years. However, for 
several reasons the Czech case is not so different from the other CEE EU 
members. First, the one billion of Chinese FDI is still far below of what has been 
announced.17 Second, perhaps more importantly, Chinese FDI is based on 
acquisitions in the real estate and financial sectors. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, recent developments call into question the sustainability of existing 
Chinese investments. The company responsible for virtually all deals – CEFC – 
got into financial trouble and its Czech assets in the country were taken over by 
the state-owned investment vehicle CITIC. 18There is a real possibility that 
CITIC might sell at least some of these investments. Moreover, the fact that it is 
state-owned means that it is difficult to sustain the argument about economic 
motivations behind Chinese investment. 
The dynamics of Chinese investment in the region plays out differently for the 
five non-EU countries in the Western Balkans – Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
                                                 
16Marta Golonka, Partners or rivals? Chinese investments in Central and Eastern Europe (Warsaw: Central & 
Eastern European Development Institute, 2012) 
17 https://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/byznys/cesko/ceska-a-cinska-strana-podepsaly-na-30-obchodnich-
dohod_377869.html; https://www.scribd.com/doc/306382671/Seznam-dohod-podepsan%C3%BDch-
b%C4%9Bhem-nav%C5%A1t%C4%9Bvy-%C4%8Dinskeho-prezidenta-v-%C4%8Cesku 
18 https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-08-30/quick-take-prague-approves-citics-takeover-of-embattled-
conglomerates-czech-assets-101320188.html  
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Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania. These countries in fact managed to attract 
Chinese investment deals ranging from a few hundred million up to a few billion 
EUR, when measured by the American Enterprise Institute ‘China Global 
Investment Tracker’ project.19 
It should not be seen as an ‘arrogant Brussels-centric’ assumption to find it 
surprising that the Balkan countries surpass Eastern EU members in terms of 
attracting investment flows. Research by the China Academy of Social Sciences, 
a government affiliated think tank, ranked the CEE countries according to their 
investment attractiveness for China. The results put the V4 countries on the 
very top while the five Balkan countries find themselves at the very bottom.20 
Chinese investments in the V4: an offer that should be scrutinized  
The obvious question then is why China invested in the Western Balkan 
countries and not elsewhere in the CEE region. The answer would also shed light 
on what lessons Central Europe can draw from this development in the Western 
Balkans. 
On the rhetoric level, China approaches the CEE region emphasizing similar 
characteristics as, for instance, other East Asian or Western European investors 
underline: access to the European common market, geographical proximity to 
Western Europe, political and social stability, and a favourable ratio between the 
price and quality of inputs (including labour).21 These factors made the EU 
members of the CEE region relatively successful economies in the 2000s thanks 
to the influx of foreign direct investments leading to the establishment of a 
production and service sector serving the Western European consumer markets. 
Yet China is now overall at a much lower development level than Japan, South 
Korea or Taiwan who have already undergone the process of deindustrialization 
and outsourced their production. China probably hopes to move the production 
from its richest areas to lesser developed provinces rather than abroad. Hence, 
the main comparative advantage of the CEE is not something which China is 
seeking. 
Looking at it from the opposite perspective, Chinese investments have been 
growing at a spectacular rate globally. Since 2002, the first wave targeted the 
developing countries with the goal of securing natural resources and building 
infrastructure. Particularly since the 2008 crisis, China has accelerated its 
investments into the developed world where it is interested in acquiring 
companies holding leading technologies or brand names. The problem with the 
EU members within the CEE region is that, from China’s perspective, they are in 
the ‘grey zone’: they are too developed to be receptive to the kind of approach 
China employs in developing countries, but they are not developed enough to 
have the kind of companies China would like to acquire in the developed world. 
                                                 
19 See http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/  
20 See Liu Zuokui, Liu, The Analysis of China’s Investment in V4 in: Current Trends and Perspectives in 
Development of China-V4 Trade and Investment, University of Economics in Bratislava, Faculty of 
International Relations, 2014 (https://fmv.euba.sk/www_write/files/dokumenty/veda-vyskum/projekty/sucasne-
trendy/China_V4.pdf ) 
21 http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/08/29/positioning-central-and-eastern-europe-for-chinese-investors-
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China’s approach to the CEE region is mainly following patterns of its approach 
to other developing regions. China has established the 16+1 platform as the 
main tool to manage relations with the region – similarly as in Africa or Latin 
America.22 One of the main tools of China to enter the region has been the offer 
of state credit linked to China-designed and constructed infrastructure projects. 
This is the Chinese mode of functioning in the developing world, but it has 
proven to be ill-suited for EU members, even if they are not as developed as the 
Western European ones. 
EU members are expected to follow market rules for government procurement. 
In other words, government-funded infrastructure projects must run a public 
tender and pick a company to realize the work based on transparent factors. 
Moreover, as relatively stable and prosperous countries, they can borrow from 
the financial markets with relatively low interest rates. 
To compare, the Chinese approach consists of a financial loan, which is often not 
even competitive when compared to the interest rates of government bonds. 
These Chinese loans come with the condition that it must be used for the specific 
project and with a certain share of contracting of Chinese companies. This 
combination of factors means that EU members have little interest to enter into 
this kind of endeavours. The long discussed railway upgrade between Budapest 
and Belgrade is a good example – although politically Hungary, as an EU 
member, seems to give full support to the project, even this is not enough so far 
to overcome EU rules. Moreover, the fact that the whole project might not be 
economical for Hungary causes significant delays. Eventually, the project may 
still be put in place, although it is highly questionable in whose interest that 
would be. 
China in the Balkans: the South-South cooperation 
On the other hand, the different situation of the Western Balkans means that 
China’s offer is interesting for them, at least initially. Not having such good 
access to EU funds and the bond market, Chinese financial loans become a 
considerable alternative. This is the case especially when the Western banks 
refuse to fund project whose profitability is in doubt, and hence the ability of the 
recipient country to repay the loan. This is the case of the Montenegro North-
South highway, which is now being constructed thanks to a Chinese loan and 
with Chinese companies and significant use of Chinese materials and labour. 
Besides economics, there are also symbolic factors which increase the appeal of 
China in Western Balkan countries and reduce it among most other EU 
countries.23 Occasionally, China labelled the 16+1 as being South-South 
cooperation and it used the rhetoric of developing countries improving their 
economic and political standing.24 This might resonate better in former Yugoslav 
countries, which recall the memory of leadership of the non-aligned movement. 
                                                 
22 Jakub Jakóbowski (2018) Chinese-led Regional Multilateralism in Central and Eastern Europe, Africa and 
Latin America: 16 + 1, FOCAC, and CCF, Journal of Contemporary China, 27:113, 659-673 
23 This argument is inspired by the research of Runya Qiaoan (unpublished), presented at the University of 
Turku in October 2018. 
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In Central Europe, however, the impression of already being part of the 
developed world is a source of national pride. 
More importantly, the specificity of China’s approach in the CEE region 
compared to other developing regions is that China talks of ‘traditional 
friendship’ and ‘common history’. It explicitly recalls the communist past of these 
countries. The problem is that most of the Eastern EU members consider this 
part of their history as anything but a tradition to build current relations on. 
Rather, many of them treat the communist decades as an ‘occupation’. 
On the other hand, many Balkan countries have a different view. For them, 
communist times were an era of relative prosperity, stability, and some 
international respect, particularly invoking the Tito period in Yugoslavia. While 
the V4 and Baltic countries have more or less successful experiences with 
transformation during the 1990s and 2000s, the Balkan countries have been 
struggling not only with economic development but also with ethnic conflicts and 
the civil war, which lead to unimaginable atrocities. Hence, when China revokes 
the memories of communist times and the solidarity of the developing countries, 
it rings a bell in the Balkans but not so much elsewhere.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, there are a few takeaways from this situation. First, the Chinese 
approach towards the CEE region is rather contradictory. While, on the one 
hand, China does see it as a sub-forum of the EU-China partnership and it seems 
to identify the potential of the Eastern EU members in economic terms (and 
perhaps also political ones), on the other hand, its approach is designed in ways 
which are at times not appropriate, interesting, or even appealing to these 
countries. 
It is a big question why China has still not adjusted its approach and 
continuously repeats this substandard offer. With progressing time, it is 
becoming less and less plausible to assert that China is not aware of the reasons 
why its approach falls on deaf ears outside the Balkans. That opens up more 
problematic explanations of China trying to change the reality in the region and 
push through with its offer, even though it might not fit the situation and 
standards in given countries and in the EU in general. While we can only 
hypothesize, Central Europe would do well to approach China with caution and 
keep its own interests firmly in mind. 
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Chinese investment in European peripheries:  
Who pays the piper calls the tune? 25  
by Ágnes Szunomár 
 
Introduction 
Without doubt, Europe has emerged as one of the top destinations for Chinese 
investment. According to Rhodium Group's statistics, annual foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows in the 28 EU economies has grown from EUR 700 million 
in 2008 to EUR 30 billion in 2017.26 That represents a quarter of total Chinese 
FDI outflows last year. However, the Chinese approach towards Europe is far 
from being unified since China follows different motives and uses different 
approaches when dealing with different countries or regions of Europe: the 
access to successful brands, high-technology and know-how motivates China 
when entering Western European markets, investments in the green energy 
industry and sustainability brings Chinese companies to Nordic countries, while 
greenfield investments (manufacturing) and recently also infrastructural 
projects pulls them to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including also the 
non-EU member Western Balkan countries.  
It is difficult to determine whether it was a deliberate Chinese strategy or the 
lack of European cohesion that has encouraged China to deal bilaterally with 
individual member states (or groups of member states) but it certainly helped to 
achieve better results for China than engagement on the EU level. This is not a 
new phenomenon but characterizes China-EU relations from the early 
beginnings. This at least partly explains, why China decided to create platforms 
such as the 16+1 initiative or the China-Nordic framework: to enhance 
cooperation in different - economic as well as political - fields and to avoid, or at 
least delay and hinder, criticism at the EU level. European responses to these 
approaches also vary considerably in different regions of the continent: some 
countries have reservations about a growing Chinese presence while others 
welcome the resulting economic opportunities. Central and Eastern Europe - 
although opinions may differ from country to country - belongs to the latter 
group. 
Chinese companies on CEE markets 
Chinese companies have increasingly been targeting CEE countries in the past 
one and a half decades, while diplomatic relations are also on the rise. This 
development is quite a new phenomenon but not an unexpected one. On one 
hand, the transformation of the global economy and the restructuring of China’s 
economy are responsible for growing Chinese interest in the developed world, 
including the European Union. On the other hand, CEE countries have also 
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26 Hanemann, T. and Huotari, M., 2018. EU-China FDI: Working towards reciprocity in investment relations. 
Rhodium Group and Mercator Institute for China Studies, https://rhg.com/research/eu-china-fdi-working-
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become more open to Chinese business opportunities, especially after the global 
economic and financial crisis with the intention of decreasing their economic 
dependency on Western (European) markets. Here, China can benefit a lot from 
the EU’s division between its core and periphery. For China, the region 
represents dynamic, largely developed, less saturated markets, new frontiers for 
export expansion, new entry points to Europe and cheap but qualified labour. 
This adds up to lower political expectations, fewer economic complaints, fewer 
protectionist barriers and fewer national security concerns in the CEE region 
compared to the Western European neighbours. The CEE countries' 
disappointment coming from the slower-than-expected catching-up processes to 
Western Europe also resulted in these countries turning towards the East. 
Recently, Western diplomats, scholars as well as media have raised attention to 
the growing Chinese influence in the CEE region and the potential implications 
for the EU or even globally. This mostly concerns China using economic relations 
(mainly investments) and other financial tools with certain European countries 
to gain political influence in Europe. Undoubtedly, there are certain signs for 
this: Hungary and Greece prevented the EU from backing a court ruling against 
China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, while Hungary’s 
ambassador to the EU was the only one not signing a report criticising the 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative for benefitting Chinese companies and Chinese 
interests.27  
But are Chinese investments really responsible for China's growing influence in 
the CEE region as Western critics claim? The answer leaves room for doubts, at 
least.  
When compared to China’s economic presence globally or in the developed world, 
China’s economic impact on the CEE countries is relatively small: They are 
highly dependent on both trade and investment relations with developed 
countries, mainly-EU member states, while China represents a minor (although 
increasing) share. From a Chinese point of view, as far as trade or investment 
statistics are concerned, the CEE region is also far from being among the most 
important partner of China. Since the main motivation of Chinese investment in 
the developed world is to access important technologies, successful brands and 
new distribution channels, Germany, the UK and France accounted for more 
than half of the total Chinese investment value last year within the EU, while 
the combined CEE region received less than five percent.28  
Hungary, for example, is among the most popular destinations for Chinese FDI 
within the CEE region: while Chinese (MOFCOM) statistics show a rather 
modest stock of Chinese investment in Hungary (314 million USD), the 
Hungarian National Bank (HNB) - where statistics are broken down according to 
ultimate investors - displays 1782 million USD. Nevertheless, the dominance of 
EU partners has to be highlighted here, too: based on OECD and HNB statistics, 
more than 75 per cent of foreign investments are coming from EU countries, 
                                                 
27 Heide, D; Hoppe, T; Scheuer, S; Stratman K, 2018. EU ambassadors band together against Silk Road. 
Handelsblatt Today, 04/17/2018, https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/politics/china-first-eu-ambassadors-band-
together-against-silk-road/23581860.html?ticket=ST-5110475-xbAfutgQKGFoxtGktQhM-ap1 
28 Hanemann, T. and Huotari, M., 2018. EU-China FDI, op. cit.  
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more than 25 per cent from Germany, while only 2.4 per cent from China. This 
2.4 per cent share is, despite being the highest in Central and Eastern Europe by 
comparison, far from being decisive. It is also true, however, that although 
Chinese multinational companies represent a relatively small share, they have 
saved and/or created jobs (especially Wanhua and Huawei) and contributed to 
the economic growth of Hungary with their investments and exports. 
Furthermore, many of them (e.g. Lenovo, ZTE, Huawei, Bank of China) have 
turned their Hungarian businesses into European regional hubs for their 
activities.29  
CEE within Belt and Road 
Besides creating potential hubs/bridges/bridgeheads/gates for Chinese products - 
as many CEE leaders portrayed their own countries when talking about the 
potentials of strengthening ties with China - in the European Union, Chinese 
companies expressed their interest in several infrastructure-related investments 
in recent years, planned under a new framework, China’s Belt and Road 
initiative. China’s motivations are easy to understand, as the New Silk Road 
project expands China's political and economic sphere of interest: once the 
alternative transport routes are completed China will be in a more favourable 
strategic position, will have more and more alternative transport routes, can 
reach its target markets more easily and quickly and will be able to reduce some 
of the industrial overcapacities accumulated in recent years. In addition, these 
projects may provide a reference for further Chinese investment in the broader 
region, especially in the more developed part of Europe. 30 
Hungary was the first European country to sign a memorandum of 
understanding with China on promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
Maritime Silk Road, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to 
Budapest in June, 2015. The Hungarian government was very keen on the 
Budapest-Belgrade railway project and when it signed the construction 
agreement in 2014, Prime Minister Orbán called it the most important moment 
in cooperation between the European Union and China.31 Infrastructure 
development is indeed a hot topic in all CEE countries; however, there are other 
resources – for example EU funds – to finance them. Therefore, a more 
interesting - and for the time being unanswered - question is: what motivates the 
Hungarian side in building infrastructure with Chinese companies, using 
Chinese credit to finance it? Here, the political factor seems to be more important 
than any economic rationale. 
The 16+1 Initiative 
a unified Europe for several reasons, ranging from economic issues (such as 
export and import relations, market size, investment opportunities, high 
                                                 
29 See Szunomár, Á; Mccaleb, A; Chen, X, 2018. Economic Relations between China and Central and Eastern 
Europe: Trade and Investment Issues. In: Weiqing Song (ed.) China's relations with Central and Eastern Europe: 
from "old comrades" to new partners. London: Routledge, pp. 48-65. 
30 See Szunomár, Á, 2015. Blowing from the East. International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Vol. 
XXIV, No. 3/2015, pp. 60-78 
31 Keszthelyi, C, 2014. Belgrade-Budapest rail construction agreement signed. Budapest Business 
Journal17/12/2014, https://bbj.hu/budapest/belgrade-budapest-rail-construction-agreement-signed_89894 
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technology, etc.) and cooperation in climate change to international recognition 
or counterbalancing the US. Although we can never be sure about China's real 
intentions, it is possible that they are simply still learning how to deal with 
Europe. For example, when China decided to strengthen its relationship with the 
CEE region - by creating the 16+1 initiative - the original idea was that this 
process will bring China even closer to Europe. Subsequently, Beijing was rather 
surprised by Western fears that China tries to divide Europe and frustrate some 
aspects of the EU’s common China policy through this initiative. This may 
explain that recently the Chinese Government offered Germany to be included in 
the 16+1 talks as an observer. Similarly, China started to think about having 
16+1 summits every two years instead of annually. Further evidence is China's 
first infrastructure-building attempt in CEE: they tried to bring in the same 
package as in the developing world - Southeast Asia or Africa - not considering 
the different and sometimes very strict rules and regulations or standards of the 
EU. As a result, while Chinese foreign direct investment targets the EU member 
CEE countries, infrastructure projects are more prevalent in the non-EU CEE 
countries, where strict EU regulations do not apply.  
Conclusions 
From the CEE point of view, China can, of course, be able provide economic 
opportunities that would help to decrease the overly significant economic 
dependency on Western Europe. But - at least for now - this is not the case: as 
mentioned above, although Chinese trade volumes and investment stocks are on 
the rise in some of the CEE countries, this is far from being decisive or 
comparable to economic relations with EU countries. Referring to the title of this 
short overview, the 'piper' is still payed by the (Western) Europeans. Accordingly, 
in economic terms, CEE’s genuine interest would be to not to risk its relationship 
with the EU. The fact that some CEE countries are 'calling new tunes', i.e. they 
act or vote in favour of China and fuelling conflicts with the EU implies that 
their further engagement with China might come from political considerations.  
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Starting Small - an Emerging Profile of Chinese SME 
Investors in Latvia to Challenge the Preconceptions on 
Chinese FDI 
by Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova 
 
The lack of progress in Sino-Latvian economic cooperation 
During the recent Parliamentary election in Latvia, a total of 16 political parties 
from across the spectrum competed for the voters’ trust. Regardless of ideology, 
however, most of the parties had one thing in common — cooperation with China 
did not appear in any of their foreign affairs platforms.32 During the debates, 
even though economy related aspects were abundant and the positive role of 
FDIs for the Latvian economy was underscored, China as an originator of such 
FDIs was not mentioned by the candidates. Such a development can seem 
surprising given the “economic cooperation” discourse surrounding the “16+1” 
format and analyses of a rising Chinese presence in the region.33 
Yet, the lack of China in the Latvian vision for economic growth can be easily 
explained. When the “16+1” was founded, the economy seemed to be at its centre, 
with business forums at the side-lines of every major “16+1” summit — 
“investment” stands as the primary aim of the initiative, only then followed by 
transport, finance, science, education, and culture.34 However, similarly to how it 
has been described in the case of other EU member states that also take part in 
the “16+1”, and admitted by China as well, the declarations and intentions have 
not resulted in major economic gains. For the last six years, since the 
establishment of China‘s transcontinental initiatives, be it Belt and Road or 
“16+1”, Latvia has not yet witnessed an upsurge of Chinese investment — 
contrary to what was expected initially. At first, the incompatibility of China’s 
offer, namely, the push for infrastructure loans that Latvia did not need, was 
mentioned as the primary reason behind the disappointing results. Later into 
the format, China adjusted the offer, centring on the promise of transport and 
logistics sector related investment. This time, more opportunities arose for 
Latvia’s big transit market players, as they signed cooperation deals with 
counterparts in several regions of China. Still, the shift did not affect the lack of 
the FDI dynamic. 
Smaller size as a solution — a case study 
When analysing the narrow flow of Chinese investment to Latvia, 
incompatibility in size is often named as one of the key issues. To illustrate the 
                                                 
32 Except for “Saskaņa”: 13. SAEIMAS VĒLĒŠANAS. Centrālā Vēlēšanu komisija. 05.10.2018. 
https://sv2018.cvk.lv/pub/CandidateLists/CandidateList? id=ZTTi%2BonHCl%2BU6o9Y9odlVw%3D%3D  
33 See, e.g. David Scott. China and the Baltic States: strategic challenges and security dilemmas for Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia. Journal of Baltic Security. 21.06.2018. 
https://content.sciendo.com/abstract/journals/jobs/4/1/article-p25.xml  
34 “16+1” Summit has concluded. Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European 
Countries.10.11.2016. http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ldrhw_1/2016lj/hdxw4/t1414327.htm  
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point, an official of the Employers’ Confederation of Latvia has said that “[…] 
even though referred to as small and medium, Chinese SMEs are still bigger in 
capital and workforce than some of our large enterprises. Therefore, no wonder 
that the companies that are referred to as big Chinese enterprises are sometimes 
bigger than all of our businesses combined.” 
Against such a pessimistic background, a new trend is emerging — since 2017, a 
wave of small Chinese businesses is starting to operate in Latvia or considering 
it. And these companies are hoping that investing in Latvia will help them go up 
the value chain. 
One of the sectors receiving most interest from Chinese SMEs is wood 
processing. Forests constitute almost 50% of Latvia’s territory, putting it in the 
4th place in Europe by forest coverage ratio. The export of timber products 
accounts for a stable 20% of Latvian total yearly exports. Latvia’s forests produce 
around 11 million cubic meters of timber per year, coming from state-owned and 
privately owned territories in roughly equal shares. 35 Clearly, such an amount of 
production is not enough to satisfy the needs for resources of large enterprises — 
even local Latvian companies at times face the exhaustion of the yearly quota 
and turn to importing wood from third countries for processing — still, a small 
scale business of China-bound niche products stands a chance. 
Three Chinese SME investors interested in Latvia’s timber processing sector 
have been interviewed for this article. Investor A has already successfully 
launched the operation in late 2018, producing small wooden objects such as ice-
cream sticks. Investor B had originally planned to build a wood decor carving 
plant but has decided against Latvia. Investor C, an owner of several furniture 
plants across China, who would like to produce high-end designer kitchen fronts 
for further assembly in China, is yet to make his decision. Regardless of the 
different outcomes, interviews have revealed a few common traits among these 
three projects. These traits demonstrate an emergence of a new kind of flexible 
SME investor profile that could be a beneficial target for investment attraction. 
1. Operation base — not in the capital. All three investors state that they started 
with the opportunities available in the capital, but quickly realised that the 
renting prices and other expenses would be too high. Therefore, they have turned 
to consider regions outside Riga, but with good infrastructure and logistic 
capacity. Therefore, the regions could possibly benefit from such projects. 
2. Workforce — mostly local, with 2-3 invited Chinese equipment operators 
during the teaching phase. The Chinese companies (esp. Investor A) have been 
working closely with the Latvian State Employment Agency to search for the 
local workforce, offering an income slightly higher than the market average. The 
required skill set would be mostly technical. Chinese language knowledge would 
only be crucial for 1 local worker in a management position. Lack of workforce is 
named as the biggest obstacle. 
                                                 
35 2018 Meža nozare skaitļos un faktos. Latvijas Republikas Zemkopības ministrija. 
https://www.zm.gov.lv/public/ck/files/skaitlifakti_LV_2018web.pdf   
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3. Tax system — the Latvian tax system is not seen as heavily burdening, overly 
complicated, or obstructing smooth operation by the interviewed investors. 
Transparency has been named as its main advantage, whereas the lack of 
stability in tax legislation — as its major drawback. 
The findings also show that the stereotypes regarding Chinese investments in 
Europe do not apply in the case of niche Chinese SMEs. First, the companies are 
willing to pay taxes and are not looking for ways to cut corners. Second, the 
investors are stating the benefits of exporting a high added value product instead 
of wood source material. Third, the companies are not against paying wages 
slightly higher than the average across this business and relying mostly on local 
workers. Forth, coming to a country with no prior contacts within the diaspora or 
among the bureaucrats, the investors prefer knocking on doors directly and 
establishing contacts with the relevant government agencies, instead of looking 
for “guanxi”36 channels. And, fifth, the prospective investors prefer greenfield 
investment, albeit small in scale, over mergers and acquisitions. 
Clearly, the cases reviewed for this article will not become flagbearers of Chinese 
investment in the region, as they are small in scale, not particularly high-tech, 
and the products are resource-based with a little to no element of innovation. 
Still, the lessons learned from the accommodation of these companies in the 
Latvian economy and from the feedback of the investors themselves could 
potentially help Latvia devise a competitive proposal for FDI — not just from 
China, but also elsewhere in the world. 
Conclusion 
Even though bigger Chinese state-owned corporations might engage in practices 
associated with unhealthy business behaviours in Europe, there is a case to be 
made in favour of Chinese small enterprises that are willing to play by the local 
book and can turn out to be beneficial for the local economy. Small Chinese 
enterprises producing high value-added products in Latvia for export, in contrary 
to big, state-owned and mighty corporations, might just be the most beneficial 
profile of a Chinese investor for the Baltic nation. Attracting small-size investors 
would help avoid the problems of production volume compatibility, lack of 
oversight typically associated with large Chinese players in the region, and risks 
of political pressure. It would further be the responsibility of Latvia to monitor 
the transparency and adherence of such companies to local laws, including 
taxation and environment protection. This task, however, is no different from 
that of supervision of any commercial actor, local or international, operating 
within the Latvian market. 
  
                                                 
36 An informal network of relationship ties within Chinese society and diaspora that is being fostered with the 
goal of the exchange in influence services. 
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